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Abstract
The last few years have witnessed an increasing emphasis on going be-
yond GDP per capita when measuring a nation’s quality of life (QoL). Coun-
tries (e.g. UK, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain) and
international organizations (e.g. OECD) have been developing methods suit-
able for non-income indicators. However, this involves serious measurement
challenges due to: (a) multidimensionality, and (b) ordinality (i.e. unlike
income these indicators do not have a natural scale). This paper is the first
summary of the methods developed in the last decade in the field of inequal-
ity and welfare measurement to address these challenges. Next, we utilize
the presented methodology and provide evidence on the ranking of OECD
countries in terms of welfare and inequality in education and happiness. We
find that when dimensions are analysed separately, welfare dominance is
frequent (42% of all comparisons in education and 31% in life satisfaction).
The number drops to only 4, 4% for bivariate dominance, which highlights
the empirical relevance of multidimensional analysis. Greece, Portugal and
Hungary feature the lowest joint welfare. Northern European countries are
most often dominating and Southern European countries are most often
dominated in both inequality and welfare analyses.
Keywords: ordinal data, quality of life, inequality and welfare, partial order,
majorization, education-happiness gradient
JEL codes: I31; D63
1 Introduction
In the last decade there has been an increasing interest among policymakers (e.g.
in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, and the UK) in measuring qual-
ity of life in a more comprehensive way than via GDP per capita statistics. In
2010 British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that in evaluating peo-
ple’s quality of life the Government would rely not only on GDP growth but also
on non-income indicators such as education, health and environment, and that
this broad measure of well-being will steer government policy.1 Cameron earlier
described monitoring people’s well-being as one of the central political issues of
1Source: The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/nov/14/happiness-
index-britain-national-mood
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our time. Since then the Oﬃce for National Statistics has been carrying out the
program “Measuring what matters” which develops new measures of national well-
being. The Canadian government has been working with the UK since 2010 on
the same problem. Mexico has been at the forefront of developing measurement
methods for tracking social progress for several years now. In 2008 the French gov-
ernment created the renowned Stiglitz-Sen-Fitousi commission in order to better
tackle the measurement of social and economic performance. The commission’s
ﬁnal report (Stiglitz et al. 2009) underlines the multidimensionality of the concept
of well-being, its relationship to non-income dimensions and the importance of in-
cluding both objective and subjective measures. On page 14 the authors write:
“To deﬁne what well-being means a multidimensional deﬁnition has to be used”,
whereas in Recommendation 7 they stress that “Quality-of-life indicators in all the
dimensions covered should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way.”
Not only governments but also international organisations and NGOs under-
take similar initiatives. In May 2011, in its 50th Anniversary Week, the OECD
launched the Better Life Index which allows citizens to compare lives across 34
countries, based on 11 dimensions such as housing, income, jobs, community, ed-
ucation, environment, governance, health, life satisfaction, safety, and work-life
balance. The Social Progress Imperative that developed the Social Progress In-
dex is an initiative that aims to “solve the world’s most pressing challenges by
redeﬁning how the world measures success". Clearly, all these initiatives prove
that policymakers are ﬁnally responding to the economists’ calls for going beyond
GDP in measuring a nation’s quality of life (Sen 1973; Fleurbaey and Blanchet
2013).
Many non-income wellbeing dimensions are available in surveys in the form of
ordinal data, i.e. variables not possessing a natural scale and whose only relevant
information is the ordering of their categories. Thus any sequence of numbers
consistent with a given ordering can be used as a scale.2 This is the case of such
well-known indicators as happiness, self-reported health, occupational status, and
educational attainment. That these variables are purely ordinal poses serious mea-
surement challenges since measures of welfare, inequality or poverty are typically
based on the mean. Here the mean changes depending on the assigned scale and
consequently the conclusions of distributional comparisons change too, which is
undesirable (e.g. see examples in Allison and Foster 2004; Kobus 2015).
New measurement theories are being developed in various ﬁelds of economics to
deal with the ordinality problem.3 This article is to serve as a “map” of the state-
of-the-art approaches to inequality and welfare measurement for ordinal data. We
2More precisely, we refer to data that are ordinal and discrete. By ordinal we mean total
orders as opposed to cardinality, where numbers are meaningful. Discrete means that there is
a fixed number of values, each carries a probability mass as opposed to continuous variables
which accord a particular value with probability zero. In general, we can have variables that
are: ordinal and discrete (such as health status); ordinal and continuous (such as the Body Mass
Index (BMI) which, as the ratio of two continuous variables, is continuous but the differences
between two BMI’s are meaningful only in an ordinal sense); cardinal and discrete (e.g. the
distribution of the number of cars in households, where there is a fixed number of values, and
particular values are meaningful); cardinal and continuous (e.g. income).
3These theories often build upon statistics literature on ordinal data e.g. Blair and Lacy
(2000), Berry and Mielke (1992).
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summarise the available methods and present them to a larger social science au-
dience. We review the measurement aspects of the quality of life when data are
ordinal and/or multidimensional. This has been considered by various authors
i.e. Allison and Foster 2004; Apouey 2007; Abul Naga and Yalcin 2008; Zheng
2011; Kobus and Miłoś 2012; Dutta and Foster 2013; Kobus 2015; Lv, Wang, and
Xu 2015, Gravel, Magdalou, and Moyes 2015, Cowell and Flachaire 2017.4 These
authors deal mostly with the case when QoL is proxied by a single variable. The
literature on multidimensional ordinal variables is very preliminary. Yalonetzky
(2013) proposes conditions and a test for multidimensional welfare and we draw
on his results. Other contributions in the area of multidimensionality have very
limited applicability e.g. Sonne-Schmidt et al. (2016) and Makdisi and Yazbeck
(2014) study only binary variables.
Next using the presented methods we provide new evidence on the ranking
of OECD countries in terms of achievement and inequality in the quality-of-life
(QoL) distribution. Thus we complete the analysis started by Balestra and Ruiz
(2014). Based on the Gallup World Poll 2010 they study inequality and welfare
comparisons also in OECD countries. Their results are largely consistent with
ours but they apply only a subset of the tools we use. Furthermore, we address
the two shortcomings acknowledged in their study, namely, the common median
assumption in the AF procedure and the lack of multidimensional analysis. We
oﬀer many more insights and test for statistical signiﬁcance where possible.
Firstly, starting with univariate distributions (education and life-satisfaction
separately) we use ﬁrst-order dominance for welfare comparisons and the ordinal
approach developed by Allison and Foster (2004) (henceforth AF) for inequality
comparisons. The latter states that a distribution which has more probability
mass concentrated around the median than another distribution is more equal.5
We use a generalisation of the AF inequality ordering which extends the scope
of its applicability. More speciﬁcally, we require that the distribution does not
have to be concentrated around the median necessarily, but it can be any other
category; we call it the AFα ordering. This generalisation comes in fact from
Mendelson (1987), but was overlooked by the literature.6 Abul Naga and Yalcin
(2008) and Kobus and Miłoś (2012) construct family of indices consistent with
the AF ordering. Some of the indices value more inequality below the median
and some value more inequality above the median. We check how these diﬀerent
value judgements inﬂuence countries’ ranking. We also use the family of indices
constructed by Cowell and Flachaire (2017) for which the reference point is the
highest category, not the median. Thanks to the recent results of Abul Naga and
Stapenhurst (2015) and Cowell and Flachaire (2017), we can now test for statisti-
cal signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between inequality measures. Then, we analyse
inequality and welfare jointly by using the H+-dominance curves developed re-
4Recent theoretical advances to deal with ordinality are, however, broader and include also
poverty measurement (Bennett and Hatzimasoura 2011; Yalonetzky 2012), dissimilarity (An-
dreoli and Zoli 2014), segregation (Cuhadaroglu 2013), inequality of opportunity (Silber and
Yalonetzky, 2011), estimation of achievement gaps (Nielsen 2015), etc.
5In Section 2.2 we offer a brief discussion on whether bi-polarisation criterion such as AF is
an appropriate inequality dominance condition. For more detailed discussion, we refer readers
to Kobus (2015). Unarguably, AF approach has been so far the most widely used approach to
measuring inequality in ordinal data.
6We thank Professor Brice Magdalou for referencing this work to us.
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cently by Gravel et al. (2015) i.e. to compare, in the income setting, Lorenz curve
takes into account only the spread, whereas Generalized Lorenz curves cares both
about the spread and the mean income. Finally, we use the results of Yalonetzky
(2013) to test for multidimensional welfare dominance. We thus shed light on
how countries compare in terms of multivariate QoL when attributes’ association
is taken into account. Univariate dominance is a necessary but not a suﬃcient
condition for a multivariate dominance.
The results we obtain oﬀer a few observations. Firstly, the countries most
often dominated are Southern European, whereas those most often dominating
are Northern European countries. This holds for diﬀerent forms of welfare and in-
equality dominance relationships tested in this paper, and for inequality measures.
Bidimensional welfare dominance relationships are almost exclusively driven by a
few countries being dominated by most countries. These are Greece, Portugal,
Hungary and, to a lower extent, France and Spain. In France the outcome is
likely driven by life satisfaction. Indeed, this is known as the “French unhappiness
puzzle” (Senik 2014). On the other hand, Eastern European countries (Estonia,
Hungary, Russia) appear to have one of the worst results in life satisfaction, for
both welfare and inequality.
Secondly, the results highlight the importance of a multidimensional welfare
analysis. There are many cases of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (henceforth
FSD) when dimensions are analysed separately. 42% of all comparisons in edu-
cation exhibit univariate FSD and 31% in life satisfaction. A diﬀerent pattern
emerges from the multidimensional analysis: Only 4.4% of all comparisons show
bivariate FSD. One should be therefore careful in drawing conclusions from single-
indicator analyses. At least among OECD countries, unidimensional dominance
relationships most often do not imply bidimensional dominance. Dimensions’ de-
pendence does matter substantially in welfare comparisons.
Thirdly, the extension of AF dominance to AFα dominance increases the num-
ber of dominance tenfold, so the problem of incompleteness is signiﬁcantly reduced
this way.
Finally, value judgements about inequality do inﬂuence countries’ rankings,
but diﬀerently for education and life satisfaction. This can be studied via in-
equality indices, which are aggregating functions with diﬀerent weights applied to
inequality below or above the median. For life satisfaction, the countries’ inequal-
ity ranking changes depending on whether inequality below or above the median
gets higher weight in the index, whereas for education, the countries’ inequality
ranking changes when the reference point changes i.e. from the median (as in the
AF approach) to the highest category (as in the Cowell-Flachaire family of indices).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the challenges of
applying standard techniques to ordinal data. We then explain in a non-formal
way the methodology developed to address these challenges. Then we introduce
formal deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we apply this methodology to study education
and happiness in OECD countries separately and jointly. Finally, we oﬀer some
discussion and conclusions (Section 4). The results are included in Tables and
Figures in Appendix A. Appendix B includes brief presentation of the statistical
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inference for bivariate welfare dominance.
2 Measurement framework
2.1 The non-robustness of location and dispersion statistics
for ordinal data
The numerous measurement problems with ordinal data have been increasingly
acknowledged in the economic literature, and the conclusions are far-reaching. In
particular, Bond and Lang (2013) show that the estimates of the black-white test
score gap in the US, a phenomenon widely studied in educational economics, are
very fragile to the choice of scaling. Recently, the same authors (Bong and Lang
2014) highlight that binominal regression techniques are also a form of arbitrary
cardinalisation of ordinal variables and are thus easily reversible in their results.
In particular, they show that the Easterlin paradox (a key concept studied in hap-
piness economics, whereby beyond a certain value more income does not appear
to be correlated with more happiness) is very sensitive to the chosen distribution
of happiness when the concept of happiness is assumed to be an underlying con-
tinuous variable with discrete representation.
The following example concerns standard inequality measures such as the Gini
index and comes from Kobus and Miłoś (2012). Similar examples were given
for the mean (Allison and Foster 2004), coeﬃcient of variation (Lazar and Silber
2013), and measures of bi-polarisation (Kobus 2015). They all reﬂect the sensi-
tivity of location and dispersion statistics to the scale.
Suppose the distributions of self-reported health status among men and women
are, respectively: h = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2) and w = (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3). That
is, 20% of men are in each health category, 30% of women are in the ﬁrst category,
etc. By assumption, higher category number indicates better health status. We
consider two scales: c = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and c˜ = (1, 2, 3, 4, 100); note that both corre-
spond to the same order of health categories. Then, under scale c the Gini index
for the men’s distribution is GINI(h, c) = 0.26 whereas for women’s distribu-
tion we get GINI(w, c) = 0.31, hence health inequality is lower among men than
women.7 However, under scale c˜ the ranking is reversed: GINI(h, c˜) = 0.72 >
GINI(w, c˜) = 0.66.
2.2 The solution: distribution-based approach
To deal with the presented problem, many authors in the last decade have started
to develop the theory of inequality and welfare measurement that is scale free and
that relies directly on the distribution of an ordinal indicator. We will now brieﬂy
describe main tools and results developed in this ﬁeld.
Similarly to the cardinal case, welfare in the ordinal case can be compared
using ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance i.e. a distribution generates higher welfare
7We calculated the Gini index by assuming there are two men in each health category, three
women in the first health category, two women in the second health category and so on. This is
valid since the Gini index is replication invariant.
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than another one if its cumulative distribution function (cdf) lies everywhere be-
low the cdf of the other distribution. Then the percentage of the population in
the i-th lowest category is not higher in dominating distribution than in the dom-
inated one, for every i. Thus the dominating distribution gives more probability
mass to higher categories than the dominated one, hence it has higher mean for
any increasing scale.
For inequality comparisons, the most widely used criterion is the one oﬀered by
Allison and Foster (2004) (AF), according to which a more unequal distribution is
the one with more probability mass further from the median. The most unequal
distribution is the one that has 50% of the mass in the lowest category and 50%
in the highest category i.e. the most bi-polarized distribution. One can trans-
form the more equal distribution into more unequal through transfers that move
probability mass away from the median. Thus Allison and Foster (2004) called
this relation a median-preserving spread, however, the formal connection between
such spreads and their deﬁnition is provided in Kobus (2015). AF criterion re-
quires that only distributions with the same median can be compared, therefore
it might be inconclusive. Then it is standard practice to resort to measures which
give complete rankings of distributions. This comes at the expense of robustness.
Indices take concrete functional forms expressing value judgements. For example,
some indices may be more sensitive than others to inequality in the lower tail of
the distribution. This translates into diﬀerent weights that a given index attaches
to inequality below and above the median. A few authors (Allison and Foster
2004, Apouey 2007, Abul Naga and Yalcin 2008, Kobus and Miłoś 2012) propose
indices consistent with the AF relationship. Abul Naga and Stapenhurst (2015)
develop inference procedures for these measures.
The AF approach has been criticised for being more about bi-polarisation
than inequality (Zheng 2008). Polarisation refers to the “disappearing middle
class” (Wolfson, 1994) and the emergence of a divided population. In a cardinal
data context, polarisation and inequality are diﬀerent concepts (Esteban and Ray
1994). In particular, polarisation may increase following the transfer of income
from the richer to the poorer as long as it increases group homogeneity. This can-
not happen with inequality measures. In a cardinal setting, inequality is measured
as deviation from the perfectly equal distribution which is unique. In an ordinal
context the most equal distribution is the one for which all mass is concentrated
in one category, but there are as many such distributions as there are categories,
so the question arises: “deviation from which distribution?” Therefore, inequality
with ordinal data is measured as deviation from the perfectly unequal distribution
and the most notable approach is the AF approach. To address the bi-polarization
problem, a diﬀerent approach, however, has been recently proposed by Gravel et
al. (2015) and Cowell and Flachaire (2017).
Gravel et al. (2015) relate ordinal inequality reduction to the Hammond’s
principle of transfers (Hammond 1976). A Hammond transfer reduces the spread
between two individuals being in diﬀerent categories of an ordinal attribute. This
is unrelated to whether the loss experienced by one individual equals the gain by
another. The Pigou-Dalton Transfer in which the same amount of income is taken
from the rich and given to the poor is thus a special case of Hammond transfer. In
an ordinal data context, the magnitudes of gains and losses cannot be compared
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anyways, therefore Hammond transfer becomes the proper notion of inequality
reduction. Gravel et al. (2015) propose inequality dominance criteria based on
Hammond transfers. They take into account both the spread and the achievement
i.e. both inequality and welfare.
The concept of status is central to the approach of Cowell and Flachaire (2017).
It is quite common in the income distribution literature to use a person’s loca-
tion in the distribution as her status in society. In particular, they focus on
downward-looking status i.e. the proportion of individuals in the classes below a
given individual and upward-looking status i.e. the proportion of individuals in the
classes above a given individual. Then they deﬁne the equality reference point e.g.
mean or median status or the maximum value of status which is 1 for the two def-
initions of status mentioned. By way of examples, they show that changes in the
mean or the median may have counterintuitive eﬀects on inequality. Therefore, in
applications, they focus on maximum status which does not have this undesirable
property.
The so far presented methodology focuses on a single ordinal indicator. The
literature on multidimensional ordinal data has been very scarce, but we use the
results of Yalonetzky (2013) to compare dimensions of QoL jointly. Indeed, it has
become common practice in the economics literature (Atkinson and Bourguignon
1982) to analyse dimensions of wellbeing jointly, namely, to acknowledge and ac-
count for their dependence. The latter may have diﬀerent impact on the joint
welfare and thus on countries’ comparisons. If attributes are considered substi-
tutes, then the positive impact of, say, better education on wellbeing decreases
for higher levels of life satisfaction (and vice versa). Here goods substitute for
each other, thus having more of one good makes an individual desire less of the
other good. The reverse holds if attributes are treated as complementary goods.
Then the impact of education on quality of life is strengthened for higher levels
of declared life satisfaction. Having more of one good makes an individual desire
even more of the other good if the two complement each other. In the case of
substitutes, the higher the association between attributes the more inequality and
less welfare, because there is higher likelihood that a given individual is deprived
in both dimensions. Distributions with lower association will thus be considered
better. Univariate dominance is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for a
multivariate dominance. That is, it may happen that although country A dom-
inates country B in both dimensions, there is no joint dominance. Univariate
comparisons may thus not be very robust when a broader view of welfare and
inequality is taken into account. This is indeed the case in our study of OECD
countries.
Yalonetzky (2013) shows that in the case of two variables we can identify up
to four ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance conditions, resembling those derived by
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) for continuous variables. These criteria diﬀer
in how they evaluate relationship between two dimensions of QoL. In one case two
dimensions are treated as substitutes and in another as complementary goods. In
the case of neutrality, having more of one good is unrelated to desiring the other
good. Yalonetzky (2013) also develops tests for multivariate stochastic dominance
conditions for ordinal variables, so we can test for joint welfare dominance between
each pair of countries.
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To sum up, below we present the formal deﬁnitions and conduct empirical
analyses for OECD countries in terms of:
(i) welfare via 6FSD
(ii) inequality via 6AFα and Iα,β, Ia,b families of measures
(iii) joint welfare and inequality via H+-dominance curves
(iv) welfare in joint distribution of education and life satisfaction via bivariate
dominance criteria.
Dominance comparisons may turn out inconclusive. Then we cannot obtain
a complete ranking of countries; however, we can rank countries based on their
tendency to outperform other countries. Copeland’s (1951) score measures this
tendency. Each country is assigned a normalised diﬀerence between the number
of countries it dominates and the number of countries it is dominated by. If x
is the number of countries considered, then the Copeland score ranges between
(−(x− 1), x− 1) which is normalised to (−1, 1). Copeland’s score is one of many
multi-criteria decision analysis tools. It has been increasingly applied to evaluate
population well-being (Arndt et al. 2016, Siersbaeck et al. 2017) and we use it
here too.
2.3 Formal definitions and notation
For presentation purposes, we deﬁne our framework and conditions in terms of
bivariate distributions; however, this can be extended to an arbitrary number of
dimensions. We deﬁne a numerical representation of categories of ordinal variables
I := I1 × I2 = {1, . . . , n1} × {1, . . . , n2} which are ordered (i.e. 1 < . . . ns,
s = 1, 2), but particular values are not important; they are only labels/names of
the categories. Let f be a probability distribution on the set I. Obviously we
require
∑n1
i=1
∑n2
j=1 fij = 1 and for all (i, j) ∈ I, fij ≥ 0. We deﬁne marginal
distributions by:
f 1i :=
n2∑
j=1
fij f
2
j :=
n1∑
i=1
fij, (1)
cumulative distributions by:
F 1i :=
i∑
k=1
f 1k F
2
j :=
j∑
l=1
f 2l , (2)
and a multidimensional cumulative distribution function F at (i, j) by:
Fij :=
i∑
k=1
j∑
l=1
fkl (3)
For each dimension s we deﬁne a median ms which is the (numbered) cate-
gory for which F sms−1 < 1/2 and F
s
ms
≥ 1/2.8 Let Λ denote a set of probability
distributions. Finally, let an inequality index be denoted by I : Λ 7→ R+.
Univariate ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance is deﬁned in the following way.
8We define the median category slightly differently than Allison and Foster (2004) to avoid
dealing with multiple medians due to empty categories. Kobus (2015) extends the AF relation
to a setting with multiple medians, so in fact AFα can be extended too in order to allow for
multiple quantiles, however this is mostly technical.
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Definition 1. First order stochastic dominance (FSD) Fixing ns ≥ 1 for
s = 1, 2 and allowing f s, gs to be two probability distributions on Is; we say that
f s first-order dominates gs i.e.
f s 6FSD g
s if and only if F si ≤ G
s
i for all i ∈ (1, . . . , ns) ,
with at least one strict inequality.
In Section 3 we use the 6FSD ordering to compare countries in terms of welfare.
FSD is closely related to the following type of transfers that move probability mass
upward:
Definition 2. Upward shift Let ǫ > 0. Fixing ns ≥ 1 for s = 1, 2 and allowing
f s, gs to be two probability distributions on Is; we say that f
s is obtained from gs
via an upward shift if there exist categories 1 ≤ m < l < ns such that
f si = g
s
i for all i different than m, l
f sm = g
s
m − ǫ, f
s
l = g
s
l + ǫ
For inequality comparisons, as already mentioned the AF relation (Allison and
Foster 2004) is typically used. Allison and Foster (2004) introduce the following
partial ordering 6AF .
Definition 3. AF relation (Allison and Foster (2004))
Fixing ns ≥ 1 for s = 1, 2 and allowing f
s, gs to be two probability distributions
on Is:
f s 6AF g
s if and only if
(AF1) f s, gs have a common median ms,
(AF2) F si ≤ G
s
i for any i < m
s,
(AF3) F si ≥ G
s
i for any i ≥ m
s,
with at least one strict inequality.
Interpreting this ordering is intuitive; in particular, f s 6AF g
s when f s is
more concentrated around the median than gs, and is therefore less unequal. The
drawback of the AF relationship is that it hinges on the common median, but
Mendelson (1987) extends it to any common quantile.
Definition 4. AFα relation (Mendelson (1987)) Fixing ns ≥ 1 for s = 1, 2
and allowing f s, gs to be two probability distributions on Is, let α ∈ [0, 1] denote
percentiles and m(α) denote the respective quantile (such that, for instance, m =
m(0.5):
f s 6AFα g
s if and only if
(AF1) f s, gs have a common m(α),
(AF2) F si ≤ G
s
i for any i < m(α),
(AF3) F si ≥ G
s
i for any i ≥ m(α),
with at least one strict inequality.
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f s 6AFα g
s when f s is more concentrated around the m(α) quantile than gs
and is therefore considered more equal. In Section 3 we check whether allowing
for more crossings signiﬁcantly reduces inconclusiveness of AF relation. Note that
the AF relationship is a special case of the AFα relationship for α = 0.5. For
instance, if we used quartiles, we would consider m(0.25),m,m(0.75).
We use two families of measures consistent with the AF. Kobus and Miłoś
(2012) propose the following family.
Ia,b :=
a
∑
i<ms F
s
i − b
∑
i≥ms F
s
i + b(nj + 1−m
s)
(a(ms − 1) + b(nj −ms)) /2
; a, b ≥ 0. (4)
When a > b the index is more sensitive to inequality below the median, whereas
the opposite is true if a < b and more weight is attached to inequality above the
median. If a = 1 and b = 1, both types of inequality are treated in the same
manner. In Section 3 we use this family of indices with a = 3, b = 1; a = 1, b =
1; a = 1, b = 3.
Abul Naga and Yalcin (2008) propose the following family of measures.
Iα,β :=
a
∑
i<ms(f
s)αi − b
∑
i≥ms(f
s)βi + nj + 1−m
s(
(ms − 1)
(
1
2
)α
+ (nj −ms)
(
1
2
)β)
+ nj −ms
; α, β ≥ 1. (5)
Similarly to the Ia,b family, α and β measure sensitivity towards inequality below
and above the median, e.g. for a given value of β, the index is more sensitive to
the inequality below the median as α → 1. Conversely, when α → ∞ the index
ignores dispersion in the bottom of the distribution. Recently, Abul Naga and
Stapenhurst (2015) provide estimation procedures and obtain explicit standard
errors formulas for both the Iα,β and Ia,b families.
We now turn to approaches that are diﬀerent than AF bi-polarization criterion.
Gravel et al. (2015) propose a novel inequality dominance criterion called H+-
dominance which is closely related to the notion of a Hammond transfer.
Definition 5. Hammond’s principle of transfers (Hammond 1976) Let
ǫ > 0. Fixing ns ≥ 1 for s = 1, 2 and allowing f
s, gs to be two probability
distributions on Is; we say that distribution f
s is obtained from distribution gs via
a Hammond’s transfer if there exist categories 1 ≤ t < h ≤ j < l < ns such that
f si = g
s
i for all i different than t, h, j, l
f sm = g
s
t − ǫ, f
s
h = g
s
h + ǫ
f sj = g
s
j + ǫ, f
s
l = g
s
l − ǫ.
A Hammond transfer brings two individuals closer in the distribution of an
ordinal attribute. H+-dominance combines both Hammond transfers and upward
shifts of probability mass. Thus it is a criterion for joint inequality and welfare
comparisons, akin to Generalised Lorenz dominance in the cardinal setting.
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Definition 6. H+-dominance (Gravel et al. 2015) Fixing ns ≥ 1 for s = 1, 2
and allowing f s, gs to be two probability distributions on Is; we define:
H+fs(i) :=
i∑
k=1
(2i−k)f sk (6)
We say that distribution f s H+-dominates distribution gs if and only if
H+fs(i) ≤ H
+
gs(i) for all i = 1, . . . , ns,
with at least one strict inequality.
The H+-dominance curve has a very simple recursive structure:
Remark 1.
H+fs(i) = 2H
+
fs(i− 1) + f
s
i (7)
Another approach which is not bi-polarisation has been proposed by Cowell and
Flachaire (2017). They measure inequality as a deviation from maximum status.
For downward-looking status (i.e. the proportion of individuals in the classes
below a given individual) this gives rise to the following measures of inequality for
α 6= 0, 1. Please recall that ns is the number of categories for dimension s (either
s = 1 or s = 2 in our framework).
Iα =
1
α(α− 1)
(
ns∑
i=1
fi
(
i∑
j=1
fj
)α
− 1
)
(8)
and for α = 0 they get
Iα = −
ns∑
i=1
fi log
(
i∑
j=1
fj
)
. (9)
Yalonetzky (2013) develops conditions for welfare comparisons of bivariate or-
dinal data. Let U(I1, I2) 7→ R+ be an individual utility function. LetW be a social
utility function mapping into the real line from all the individual utility functions in
a particular society. W is symmetric with respect to individuals, additively decom-
posable, and satisﬁes the population principle i.e. it attains the same value when
all individual utility functions are replicated. Consider also the partial-diﬀerence
U1(i, j) ≡ U(i, j)− U(i− 1, j) (with similar deﬁnition for U2(i, j)) and the cross-
partial diﬀerence U12(i, j) ≡ U(i, j)− U(i− 1, j)− U(i, j − 1) + U(i− 1, j − 1, ).
Let SA12(i, j) ≡ Pr[I1 ≥ i ∧ I2 ≥ j] be the joint survival function. Finally, in any
comparison of statistics between society A and B consider the following deﬁnition
of diﬀerences, e.g. for the case of W : ∆W ≡ WA −WB. We have the following
ﬁrst-order dominance criteria.
Definition 7. FSD BIVARIATE (FSDB) ∆W > 0 for all U characterised
by U1(i, j) > 0, U2(i, j) > 0 and U12(i, j) ≤ 0 or U12(i, j) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) if
and only if ∆S12(i, j) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) (with at least one strict inequality) and
∆F12(i, j) ≤ 0 for all (i, j) (with at least one strict inequality).
Definition 8. FSD ALEP S (FSDAS) ∆W > 0 for all U characterised by
U1(i, j) > 0, U2(i, j) > 0, U12(i, j) ≤ 0 for all (i, j) if and only if ∆F12(i, j) ≤ 0
for all (i, j) (with at least one strict inequality).
11
We call Deﬁnition 8 “FSD ALEP S” because it applies only to individual
utility functions characterised by the so-called Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto
(ALEP) substitutability (i.e. U12(i, j) < 0). Kannai (1980) gives a description of
ALEP concepts of substitution and complementarity for discrete variates and we
use them here. In this case two goods are treated as substitutes.
Definition 9. FSD ALEP C (FSDAC) ∆W > 0 for all U characterised by
U1(i, j) > 0, U2(i, j) > 0, U12(i, j) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) if and only if ∆S12(i, j) ≥ 0
for all (i, j) (with at least one strict inequality).
We call Deﬁnition 9 “FSD ALEP C” because it applies only to individual utility
functions characterised by ALEP complementarity (i.e. U12(i, j) > 0). In this case
two goods are treated as complementary goods.
Definition 10. FSD ALEP N (FSDAN) ∆W > 0 for all U characterised by
U1(i, j) > 0, U2(i, j) > 0, U12(i, j) = 0 for all (i, j) if and only if ∆F1(i) ≤ 0 for
all (i, j) (with at least one strict inequality) and ∆F2(j) ≤ 0 for all (i, j) (with at
least one strict inequality).
We call Deﬁnition 10 “FSD ALEP N” because it applies only to individual
utility functions characterised by ALEP neutrality (i.e. U12(i, j) = 0). In this case
two goods are considered separately i.e. their association does not matter.
There is an interesting logical connection between these four ﬁrst-order bivari-
ate dominance conditions (Remark 2).
Remark 2. (i) (A ≥FSDB B) if and only if (A ≥FSDAS B and A ≥FSDAC B)
(ii) (A ≥FSDAS B or A ≥FSDAC B) implies (A ≥FSDAN B)
(iii) (A ≥FSDB B) implies ( A ≥FSDAN B).
The tests of these conditions come from Yalonetzky (2013) (please see Ap-
pendix).
3 Results
The non-income dimensions chosen in this study are education and life satisfaction.
Education is included in many measures of multidimensional welfare e.g. Human
Development Index (UNDP 2014) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire et
al. 2015). Several governments are now measuring happiness. Moreover, some
countries like Bhutan even try to maximise it. The high-proﬁle report by Stiglitz
et al. (2009) underlies the need to promote survey measures of wellbeing to inform
policy. The United Nations passed a resolution in 2011 encouraging countries to
evaluate nations’ happiness, and in 2012 it published the World Happiness Report
for the ﬁrst time. As Richard Layard writes: “happiness should become the goal
of policy, and the progress of national happiness should be measured and analysed
as closely as the growth of GDP” (Layard 2005, pp. 147).
The data we use come from merging the World Values Survey and European
Values Survey databases. We evaluate the years 2006-2012 (Waves 5 and 6) for
which the data covered 37 OECD countries. Education and life satisfaction. in
these surveys are multi-level indicators described in detail in Table 1. The sam-
ple sizes range from 784 (New Zealand) to 2809 (South Africa) respondents (a
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complete overview is in Table 2). The number of possible pair-wise dominance
relationships we consider is 666 i.e. we consider all situations where there is a
dominance of A over B but no dominance of B over A.
We start with welfare analysis according to Deﬁnition 1. We ﬁnd substantial
number of dominance relationships: 42% pair-wise comparisons exhibit dominance
in education and 31% in life satisfaction (Table 3). The leading countries in both
dimensions are similar and these are mostly Northern European countries, Aus-
tralia, South Korea and New Zealand. Yet the correlation between countries’
ranks in both dimensions is very low i.e. 0.146. This is because there are many
countries which are high up in one dimension but signiﬁcantly lower in the other
e.g. Brazil (21st in education and 5th in life satisfaction) or Germany (5th in ed-
ucation and 16th in life satisfaction). The most dominated countries in education
are Southern European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal) and South American
countries (Chile, Brazil). This tendency for Northern Europe to outperform and
for Southern Europe to underperform exhibits stability throughout further com-
parison. The FSD results for life satisfaction are consistent with Balestra and
Ruiz (2014), but less so for education i.e. their dominating countries occupy mid-
dle positions here (United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands).
Comparing countries in terms of inequality according to Deﬁnition 4 (i.e. the
dominated countries are more equal) we note that the AFα is a signiﬁcant im-
provement over AF relation (Table 4 and 5). The number of dominances increases
tenfold when other points than the median are considered i.e. values of α diﬀerent
than 1
2
. Here too Northern European countries occupy relatively high ranks. Inter-
estingly, for inequality, the rankings of countries in education and life satisfaction
are negatively correlated. The value of the correlation coeﬃcient equals −0.107.
That is, countries that are more equal in one dimension are slightly more likely to
be less equal in the other dimension. On the other hand, the rankings of countries
in welfare and inequality dominance are signiﬁcantly positively correlated, both
in education (0.412) and in life satisfaction (0.556). That is, for both dimensions
there is signiﬁcant likelihood that the country which is dominant/dominated in
terms of welfare is also dominant/dominated in terms of inequality.
Diﬀerences between countries in inequality values as measured by both Ia,b
and Iα,β are almost always statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level of signiﬁcance.
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Generally, for most countries educational inequality is higher than life satisfaction
inequality as measured by both Ia,b and Iα,β (Figure 1 and 2). Life satisfaction in-
equality changes more than educational inequality with diﬀering weights attached
to inequality below and above the median. In particular, for education the aver-
age inequality ranges from I˜3,1 = 0.46 to I˜1,3 = 0.52 and for life satisfaction from
I˜3,1 = 0.29 to I˜1,3 = 0.41. Another way to see this is to study the stability of
countries’ rankings. For education, the ranking of countries does not change much
with diﬀerent weights; the correlation between I1,1 and I3,1 is 0.82, whereas for life
satisfaction, the rankings are much less stable when diﬀerent value judgements are
employed (i.e. the correlation between I1,1 and I1,3 is signiﬁcantly lower at 0.54).
Northern European countries have lower average values of inequality in education
for I3,1 (I˜3,1 = 0.38) and higher for I1,3, (I˜1,3 = 0.55), whereas the reverse is true
9These are large tables of comparisons of each country against each other. They are available
on demand.
13
for Southern European countries (I˜3,1 = 0.61 > I˜1,3 = 0.52). This suggests that in
Northern Europe the key driver of educational inequality is the higher end of the
distribution, whereas in Southern Europe it is inequality in the lower end of the
distribution that is the most important. Consistent with Balestra and Ruiz (2014),
Austria is the most equal country in education and the Netherlands and Belgium
in life satisfaction. However, for education, we obtain very diﬀerent results than
theirs when the reference point is not the median, but maximum status i.e. the
Cowell-Flachaire family of indices (Figure 3)10 For life satisfaction, the results re-
main the same as with AF approach. Thus life satisfaction inequality shows more
stability than educational inequality with respect to changes in the reference point.
OECD countries appear very heterogenous when it comes to joint inequality
and welfare in education (Figure 4 (a)). New Zealand and the USA dominate
the vast majority of OECD countries, 33 and 32 of them respectively, and the
two are not comparable with each other i.e. their H+ curves cross. For life sat-
isfaction inequality and welfare, the diﬀerences between countries’ curves appear
smaller (Figure 4 (b)). Some countries (Portugal, Greece, Mexico) that have the
highest educational inequality and lowest welfare combined, fare very well in life
satisfaction dimension. Eastern Europe has the worst outcomes for joint welfare
and inequality in life satisfaction. It is important to note that we should nat-
urally except more dominance relationships based on H+ dominance than FSD
dominance. This is because the former criterion requires robustness across wel-
fare measures that react with higher values both to upward shifts and Hammond
transfers, whereas FSD requires agreement over all welfare function increasing on
upward shifts (regardless of how they react to Hammond transfers). Indeed, in
Table 3 we see that the USA does not dominate any country in either education or
life satisfaction, whereas according to Deﬁnition 6 it dominates most other OECD
countries in education. Secondly, if country A ﬁrst-order dominates B then A will
also dominate B in terms of Deﬁnition 6, yet the reverse is not true. Therefore all
FSD relationships that we found in Table 3 get “pasted” onto Figures 4 (a) and
(b).11
In 4, 4% of comparisons we ﬁnd bivariate dominance (B, S, C or N together)
(Table 6). As can be seen the bivariate dominance is much rarer than univariate
dominance relationships. Bivariate dominance is mainly driven by three countries
which are dominated by most other countries (Greece, Hungary and Portugal).
The importance of bivariate analysis is best seen in 7 cases in which despite uni-
variate dominance in each dimension (N in Table 6), no bidimensional dominance
is found. Unidimensional dominance relationships are only a necessary but in-
suﬃcient condition for bidimensional dominance, therefore analysing dimensions
separately one may wrongly conclude joint welfare being higher or lower. South-
ern Europe appears to have the lowest multidimensional welfare among OECD
countries.
Since we analyse the joint distribution of education and life satisfaction in
10An individual enjoys a maximum status if everyone else is either in categories below hers or
in her same category.
11We can also visualise the unidirectional relationship between FSD and Definition 6 by noting
that: H+fs(i) = H
+
F s(i) =
∑i−1
k=1 2
i−k−1F sk +F
s
i . Hence FSD implies Definition 6, but the reverse
is not true.
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OECD countries, our paper also relates to the literature on the education-happiness
relationship. The relationship between education and happiness is admittedly
important, because if education and happiness are positively associated then a
seemingly natural hypothesis is that it might be possible to inﬂuence a nation’s
happiness through the design of educational policies.12 Therefore, this relation-
ship has been broadly analysed in various domains of social science (e.g. Michalos
1985; Di Tella et al. 2001; Becchetti et al. 2006; Cunado and de Garcia 2012
amongst others) and medicine (e.g. Stewart-Brown et al. 2015 and papers cited
therein). Already thirty years ago, in a ﬁrst meta-analysis on the topic, Witter
et al. (1984) found that the so-called education-happiness gradient is positive,
i.e. education is signiﬁcantly positively related to subjective well-being. However,
the literature that followed is inconclusive. Becchetti et al. (2006) ﬁnd a positive
eﬀect of education on happiness, whereas other studies ﬁnd insigniﬁcant (e.g. In-
glehart and Klingemann 2000) or negative results (Clark and Oswald 1996). More
recent studies are inconclusive too. Using a broader spectrum of education levels
for Spain, Cunado and de Garcia (2012) ﬁnd that controlling for labour and in-
come situation, as well as other socio-economic variables, education has a positive
relationship to happiness. On the other hand, utilising a British Cohort Study,
Layard et al. (2014) ﬁnd that, among socio-economic controls, education is the
least important predictor of life-satisfaction. Such inconclusiveness may be par-
tially due to the arbitrary cardinalisation of education and happiness indicators
imposed by probit or logit regressions. This is essentially the problem highlighted
by Bond and Lang (2014).
Here we analyse the implications of the education-happiness relationship on
cross-country welfare comparisons independent of cardinalisation. As pointed out
by Duclos and Echevin (2011) in the health-income context, dominance compar-
isons are more general than the analysis of education-happiness gradients as they
take into account changes in the whole distribution. Findings in Table 6 are consis-
tent with the inconclusive relationship between education and happiness found in
the literature. If any form of association between education and happiness, positive
or negative, is not robust to alternative scales in most countries then it should not
be a surprise to ﬁnd lack of agreement in ranking them among two sets of bivari-
ate welfare indices: those that increase when the two variables are more positively
associated (i.e. characterised by ALEP complementarity), and those that decrease
in the same situation (characterised by ALEP substitutability). This is exactly
reﬂected in Table 6 where B, S, and C dominance relationships are very scarce,
in fact less than 4, 4% as the latter number includes 7 cases of multiple univariate
dominance unmatched by bivariate joint dominance.
4 Conclusions and discussion
We collect in one place and review the theoretical results concerning welfare and
inequality measurement for ordinal data. Then, using these results we compare
OECD countries in terms of univariate welfare and inequality separately, inequal-
ity and welfare together, and joint bivariate welfare. This has been recently studied
by Balestra and Ruiz (2014), but our analysis uses a much more extensive toolkit
and thus oﬀers a more in-depth view. We use several methods and measures, but
12Obviously, causality may run in both directions, therefore the use of the word “hypothesis”.
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some patterns emerge. Northern European countries occupy most often better
positions in the rankings. This is true for FSD, AFα, H
+ dominance relation-
ships and for inequality measures. On the contrary, Southern European countries
appear most often in the least favourable parts of the rankings. These groups of
countries have also diﬀerent patterns of educational inequality; namely, in North-
ern Europe above-median inequality is higher than its average value for all OECD
countries, whereas in Southern Europe below-median inequality is higher than its
average value for all OECD countries. Greece and Portugal have also the low-
est bidimensional welfare, followed by Spain. Eastern Europe (Estonia, Hungary,
Russia) appears to have one of the worst results in life satisfaction, for both welfare
and inequality. Varying the reference point in the inequality dominance approach
(AF ) substantially improves the conclusiveness of the method. Life satisfaction
inequality takes place mostly in the higher end of the distribution. We stress the
importance of multidimensional analysis: in most cases unidimensional dominance
relationships do not imply bidimensional dominance. Our welfare dominance re-
sults enable us to unambiguously declare that some countries have lower welfare
than other countries, and this conclusion is very robust.
Most of the authors in social choice theory have turned to the distribution
approach presented in this paper to solve the problem of scaling when measuring
welfare and inequality with ordinal data. This approach has certainly its limita-
tions. Firstly, FSD, AFα, and H
+ dominance relationships may yield inconclusive
results when no dominance is found between two countries. For example, 42% of
comparisons in education are found to be FSD dominance. This provides limited
information about the welfare of all countries. That is, we are unable to provide a
complete ranking of countries in terms of educational welfare. This can be partially
remedied by using Copeland scores which rank countries according to their ten-
dency to outperform other countries in dominance relationships. However, some
countries have the same Copeland score so they still remain incomparable.
Secondly, in order to obtain full conclusiveness and complete rankings we resort
to indices. This comes at the cost of additional assumptions underlying these mea-
sures. The rankings obtained in this way rely on a weighting scheme. Thirdly, as
expected, inconclusiveness becomes much more pronounced with increasing num-
ber of dimensions. For two dimensions we ﬁnd welfare dominance only in 4, 4%
of the cases. Although this is inconvenient, it also reveals that one should be
careful drawing conclusions about welfare based on a single dimension or separate
treatment of dimensions. Such conclusions usually do not hold when outcomes
are treated in a truly joint manner. Dependence between dimensions signiﬁcantly
changes welfare comparisons.
Finally, the dominance approach does not provide information on whether a
given country is much or only slightly better than the dominated country. There-
fore, country A may dominate country B for education and the reverse might be
true for life satisfaction, but we will not know how large is the diﬀerence in each
case unless we resort to indices (with their aforementioned concomitant costs).
Acknowledging the limitations of the current approach, it is worth mentioning
that a diﬀerent approach to handling ordinal data has been proposed in a series of
papers by M. Fattore and F. Maggino and other col- leagues (Fattore et al. 2011a,
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2011b, 2012, Fattore and Maggino 2014, Fattore 2017).13 It exploits the fact that
the multidimensional dataset has a partial order structure. The authors use the
results from partial-order theory to build syn- thetic indicators that achieve full
comparability without scaling ordinal variables and aggregating them. If a given
proﬁle (e.g. educational attainment takes the value “high school” and life satisfac-
tion equals “bad”) is considered a benchmark/a reference point, then one counts
over linear extensions (i.e. complete ranking of alternatives, preserving the orders
of the original partial order) how frequently a proﬁle is classiﬁed below or above a
reference point. For each linear extension one can use unidimensional inequality
indices. Some regularity needs to be preserved (i.e. in line with inequality mea-
surement axioms) when either the structure of the partial order or the probability
distribution over it changes. To oﬀer brief comparison with the approach presented
here, as already mentioned, most of the results presented in this paper are for the
unidimensional case with Yalonetzky (2013) as the only exception so far. The
standard approach in the social choice theory (and the one followed by Yalonet-
zky 2013) is to take the partial-order structure as given and to exploit various
partial-order relations deﬁned on distributions (or variables in a cardinal setting)
that preserve inequal- ity/welfare axioms. Complete conclusiveness is achieved via
constructing measures of inequality that are consistent with a partial order. Ro-
bustness is provided by the characterization of measures. Diﬀerent measures will
produce diﬀerent results; however, characterization ensures that one understands
the properties and value judgements behind these measures. That is, normative
valuation is inherently embedded in the measurement exercise.
Multidimensionality remains the most important open problem in the ﬁeld
presented in this article. This concerns not only ordinal variables but also the
combination of ordinal and cardinal variables. Another problem is to formally
diﬀerentiate between inequality and polarization in an ordinal setting. Given the
recent contributions of Gravel et al. (2015), Cowell and Flachaire (2017), and
Cowell, Kobus and Kurek (2017) who develop approaches to ordinal inequality
diﬀerent than Allison and Foster (2004) bi-polarization ordering, it seems likely
that this problem will be dealt with soon. A diﬀerent problem within the AF ap-
proach is to oﬀer deﬁnitions of AF criterion that are independent of the median.
AFα is one such deﬁnition, but others have been very recently oﬀered too (Sarkar
and Satra 2017).
That said, the results developed in the last decade in the ﬁeld of welfare and
inequality measurement for ordinal data allow us to analyse inequality and welfare
without the assumptions of a parametric form for the distributions underlying the
observed data. As pointed out by Bond and Lang (2014) these assumptions are
essentially another form of arbitrary scaling of data that are scale free. Thus the
conclusions we obtain using dominance concepts and measures for ordinal data
are more robust than imposing some form of scaling.
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Table 1: Description of dimensions
Dimension Indicator Level Construction
Education
Highest
educational level
attained
1 Primary school or no education
2 Technical school
3 Secondary school
4 University
Life satisfaction
Self-reported
satisfaction with
life on a scale of
1 to 5
1 Completely dissatisﬁed
2
3
4
5 Completely satisﬁed
Figure 1: The values of Ia,b indices
(a) for a=1, b=1
(b) for a=1, b=3
(c) for a=3, b=1
Notes: Figure gives the values of Ia,b family of indices for the cases when inequality below and
above the median is treated equally I1,1, when inequality below the median matters more I3,1
and when inequality above the median matters more I1,3.
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Table 2: List of abbreviations
Abbreviation Country sample size
AUS Australia 1034
AUT Austria 1508
BEL Belgium 1507
BRA Brazil 1468
CAN Canada 2132
CHL Chile 969
CZE Czech Republic 1800
DNK Denmark 1485
EST Estonia 1527
FIN Finland 1116
FRA France 1495
DEU Germany 2066
GRC Greece 1496
HUN Hungary 1002
ISL Iceland 786
IDN Indonesia 1884
IRE Ireland 992
ITA Italy 1470
JPN Japan 2331
KOR South Korea 1180
LUX Luxembourg 1584
MEX Mexico 1926
NLD Netherlands 1858
NZL New Zealand 784
NOR Norway 1087
POL Poland 961
PRT Portugal 1541
RUS Russia 2452
SVK Slovakia 1480
SVN Slovenia 1049
ZAF South Africa 2809
ESP Spain 1151
SWE Sweden 1176
CHE Switzerland 1259
TUR Turkey 1510
GBR United Kingdom 1477
USA United States 2208
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Table 3: Cumulative outcomes of FSD comparisons and Copeland score
EDUCATION LIFE SATISFACTION
dominates dominated score rank dominates dominated score rank
AUS 17 2 0.405 2 5 0 0.135 5
AUT 1 0 0.027 10 5 4 0.027 8
BEL 6 5 0.027 10 9 0 0.243 2
BRA 0 25 -0.676 21 7 2 0.135 5
CAN 7 5 0.054 9 11 0 0.297 1
CHL 1 10 -0.243 19 5 0 0.135 5
CZE 1 0 0.027 10 5 5 0.000 9
DNK 5 0 0.135 7 9 0 0.243 2
EST 12 0 0.324 3 0 17 -0.459 18
FIN 17 0 0.459 1 8 0 0.216 3
FRA 6 5 0.027 10 2 7 -0.135 13
DEU 7 0 0.189 5 1 11 -0.270 16
GRC 1 9 -0.216 18 0 13 -0.351 17
HUN 1 11 -0.270 20 0 19 -0.514 19
ISL 9 3 0.162 6 8 0 0.216 3
IDN 5 4 0.027 10 1 7 -0.162 14
IRE 2 6 -0.108 15 8 0 0.216 3
ITA 1 7 -0.162 17 1 3 -0.054 11
JPN 5 3 0.054 9 1 2 -0.027 10
KOR 12 0 0.324 3 0 2 -0.054 11
LUX 3 5 -0.054 13 2 0 0.054 7
MEX 2 7 -0.135 16 2 0 0.054 7
NLD 3 4 -0.027 12 3 0 0.081 6
NZL 9 0 0.243 4 1 0 0.027 8
NOR 6 0 0.162 6 7 0 0.189 4
POL 1 3 -0.054 13 1 1 0.000 9
PRT 0 8 -0.216 18 0 4 -0.108 12
RUS 3 0 0.081 8 0 8 -0.216 15
SVK 0 0 0.000 11 0 1 -0.027 10
SVN 0 2 -0.054 13 0 0 0.000 9
ZAF 0 3 -0.081 14 0 1 -0.027 10
ESP 0 4 -0.108 15 0 1 -0.027 10
SWE 1 1 0.000 11 0 0 0.000 9
CHE 1 1 0.000 11 1 0 0.027 8
TUR 0 1 -0.027 12 0 0 0.000 9
GBR 0 1 -0.027 12 0 0 0.000 9
USA 0 0 0.000 11 0 0 0.000 9
Notes: For a list of abbreviations refer to Table 2. Table 3 gives the outcomes of FSD compar-
isons and Copeland scores for each country (a lower rank means greater tendency to outperform
other countries). The Copeland score is the number between (−(x − 1), x − 1), where x is the
number of countries a given country might dominate. Here the score is normalised to (−1, 1).
Countries that have the same value of the score are assigned the same rank.
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Table 4: Outcomes of α-quantile dominance
EDUCATION LIFE SATISFACTION
Percentiles 1/5 1/4 1/3 2/5 1/2 3/5 2/3 3/4 4/5 1/5 1/4 1/3 2/5 1/2 3/5 2/3 3/4 4/5
AUS 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 11 1 1 4 4 4 4 3 3 6
AUT 1 3 4 7 14 16 18 12 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 9
BEL 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 5 1 3 6 6 6 6 1 7 11
BRA 5 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 9
CAN 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 3 7 2 4 7 7 7 6 1 9 14
CHL 7 7 6 6 3 2 2 1 1 7 3 4 6 6 6 5 2 4
CZE 11 9 9 7 2 5 9 6 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
DNK 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 5 2 2 2 2 1 2 6 10 14
EST 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 6 10 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
FIN 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 10 16 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 10 14
FRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
DEU 2 4 5 8 11 10 10 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GRC 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HUN 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ISL 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 7 11 3 3 3 3 3 1 7 14 18
IDN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 7 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
IRE 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 13 18
ITA 3 3 2 1 5 7 10 8 5 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 3
JPN 1 1 2 3 4 5 5 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
KOR 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 11 17 6 6 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
LUX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 7 11
MEX 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 9 13
NLD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 7 11 20 25 25 24 17 7 2
NZL 4 4 4 4 1 4 8 15 22 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 8 12
NOR 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 10 14 1 1 1 1 1 3 10 19 24
POL 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 6 6 2 3 3 3 3 3 1
PRT 6 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
RUS 6 6 4 1 2 3 2 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SVK 17 16 15 12 3 2 7 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
SVN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 4 8
ZAF 1 1 1 2 5 7 9 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
ESP 5 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 10 5 2 3 3 3 3 2
SWE 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 7 12 2 4 7 7 7 7 2 8 13
CHE 1 1 2 3 6 7 7 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 6 12 16
TUR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 5
GBR 7 7 6 5 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 5 8
USA 1 1 1 1 3 6 10 16 23 2 1 3 3 3 3 1 6 9
SUM 110 108 95 92 90 109 141 170 225 89 88 102 103 103 103 110 190 262
PERCENT 0,17 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,16 0,21 0,26 0,34 0,13 0,13 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,29 0,39
Notes: For a list of abbreviations refer to Table 2. The table gives for each value of α the number
of countries a given country dominates in terms of AFα dominance (Definition 4). PERCENT
gives the number of dominances for a given α divided by the number of all potential dominances
i.e. 666. If country 1 dominates country 2 for at least one value of α, then country 2 does not
dominate country 1 for any α.
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Table 5: Outcomes of AFα comparisons (for all α) and Copeland score
EDUCATION LIFE SATISFACTION
dominates dominated score rank dominates dominated score rank
AUS 10 10 0.000 16 8 13 -0.139 19
AUT 21 0 0.583 3 8 16 -0.222 22
BEL 6 17 -0.306 22 15 5 0.278 9
BRA 5 0 0.139 13 8 10 -0.056 17
CAN 10 14 -0.111 18 19 2 0.472 4
CHL 8 20 -0.333 23 14 5 0.250 10
CZE 21 1 0.556 4 3 22 -0.528 25
DNK 6 0 0.167 12 14 0 0.389 6
EST 13 4 0.250 10 1 0 0.028 15
FIN 15 2 0.361 7 13 3 0.278 9
FRA 3 21 -0.500 26 2 24 -0.611 28
DEU 17 2 0.417 5 0 3 -0.083 18
GRC 1 9 -0.222 21 0 31 -0.861 31
HUN 3 8 -0.139 19 1 0 0.028 15
ISL 12 9 0.083 15 19 0 0.528 3
IDN 6 20 -0.389 24 2 23 -0.583 27
IRE 4 19 -0.417 25 17 2 0.417 5
ITA 11 3 0.222 11 3 23 -0.556 26
JPN 9 9 0.000 16 4 2 0.056 14
KOR 16 2 0.389 6 5 0 0.139 12
LUX 0 26 -0.722 28 10 7 0.083 13
MEX 1 9 -0.222 21 12 1 0.306 8
NLD 2 20 -0.500 26 24 0 0.667 1
NZL 24 0 0.667 2 12 10 0.056 14
NOR 14 6 0.222 11 23 0 0.639 2
POL 3 23 -0.556 27 7 16 -0.250 23
PRT 5 1 0.111 14 1 1 0.000 16
RUS 12 2 0.278 8 0 2 -0.056 17
SVK 25 0 0.694 1 1 25 -0.667 29
SVN 0 28 -0.778 29 12 5 0.194 11
ZAF 9 0 0.250 10 1 29 -0.778 30
ESP 4 7 -0.083 17 13 0 0.361 7
SWE 11 5 -0.167 12 18 1 0.472 4
CHE 11 8 0.083 15 16 2 0.389 6
TUR 0 28 -0.778 29 5 21 -0.444 24
GBR 8 14 -0.167 20 8 15 -0.194 20
USA 22 1 0.583 3 11 11 0.000 16
Notes: For a list of abbreviations refer to Table 2. Table gives Copeland scores for AFα com-
parisons. The Copeland score is the number between (−(x − 1), x − 1), where x is the number
of countries a given country might dominate. Here the score is normalised to (−1, 1). Countries
that have the same value of the score are assigned the same rank.
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Figure 2: The values of Iα,β indices
(a) for alpha=1, beta=2
(b) for alpha=2, beta=1
(c) for alpha=2, beta=2
(d) for alpha=2, beta=4
Notes: Figure gives the values of Iα,β family of indices for the cases when either inequality below
or above the median is given higher weight.
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Figure 3: The values of Iα indices
Notes: Figure gives the values of Iα index for the case when α = 0.
27
Notes: Figure gives the results of H+ dominance (Definition 6) which measures both inequality and welfare (Gravel et al. 2015).
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Figure 4: H+-dominance curves for education (a) and life satisfaction (b) for OECD countries
(a) Education
Notes: Figure gives
the results of H+ dominance (Deﬁnition 6) which measures both inequality and welfare (Gravel et al. 2015).
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(b) Life satisfaction
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Table 6: Bivariate dominance
AUS AUT BEL BRA CAN CHL CZE DNK EST FIN FRA DEU GRC HUN ISL IDN IRE ITA JPN
AUS NS NS
AUT
BEL NC
BRA
CAN NB NB
CHL
CZE
DNK
EST
FIN NS NB NS NS
FRA NS
DEU
GRC
HUN
ISL NS NS NS NS
IDN
IRE N
ITA
JPN NS
KOR NB
LUX
MEX
NLD
NZL NS NS NS NS NS
NOR NS NS NB NB NS
POL
PRT
RUS
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
SWE NS NB NB NB
CHE NB NB N
TUR
GBR
USA NS NB NB
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KOR LUX MEX NLD NZL NOR POL PRT RUS SVK SVN ZAF ESP SWE CHE TUR GBR USA
AUS
AUT
BEL N NS
BRA
CAN N NS
CHL NS
CZE
DNK
EST
FIN NS
FRA
DEU
GRC
HUN
ISL N NS N
IDN
IRE NS
ITA
JPN
KOR
LUX
MEX
NLD NB NS
NZL
NOR NS NS NS N
POL
PRT
RUS
SVK
SVN NS
ZAF
ESP
SWE NS NS NS
CHE NS NB NS
TUR
GBR
USA NS
Notes: For a list of abbreviations refer to Table 2. Table gives the results of bivariate dominance comparisons (Section ??). A letter in a cell indicates that a row country
dominates the column country according to a given type of dominance. B refers to bivariate dominance in terms of Definition 7 of all forms of ALEP interactions; S
refers to Definition 8 involving ALEP substitutability, C refers to Definition 9 involving ALEP complementarity, and N refers to Definition 10 involving ALEP neutrality.
32
Appendix B
The tests of bivariate dominance conditions developed in Section 2.3 rely on the
following statistics: ∆S12(ij), ∆F12(ij), ∆F1(i) and ∆F2(j). One straightfor-
ward method is an intersection-union test of the form proposed by Yalonetzky
(2013). In the case of the dominance relationship in FSDAS, the test’s null
hypothesis is that ∆F12(ij) = 0 ∀(i, j) 6= (n1, n2). The alternative hypothesis
is that ∆F12(ij) < 0 ∀(i, j) 6= (n1, n2). Now, let SE(∆F12(ij)) be the stan-
dard error of ∆F12(ij) (i.e. we are comparing samples).
13 Then we know that
when the central limit theorem applies, i.e. when the sample size is large enough,
zF12(ij) ≡ ∆F12(ij)
SE(∆F12(ij))
converges in distribution to a standard normal distribution.
We reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative if max{zF12(ij)} ≤ −zα
where −zα is the left-tail critical value in a one-tailed test. The overall level of
signiﬁcance of this test is also bound to be α although its size (i.e. the error type
I) is very likely to be lower.
In the case of the relationship in FSDAC we use the statistics zS12(ij) ≡
∆S12(ij)
SE(∆S12(ij))
, and the alternative hypothesis is of the form: ∆S12(ij) > 0 ∀(i, j) 6=
(0, 0). We reject the null in favour of the alternative if min{zS12(ij)} ≥ zα where
zα is the right-tail critical value in a one-tailed test. Again, the overall level of
signiﬁcance is also α even though the actual size is lower.
For the relationship in FSDB we test a null hypothesis of∆F12(ij) = 0 ∀(i, j) 6=
(n1, n2) and ∆S12(ij) = 0 ∀(i, j) 6= (0, 0) against an alternative of ∆F12(ij) <
0 ∀(i, j) 6= (n1, n2) and ∆S12(ij) > 0 ∀(i, j) 6= (0, 0). We reject the null hypothesis
if max{zF12(ij)} ≤ −zα and min{z
S12(ij)} ≥ zα, again, with an overall level of
signiﬁcance of α.
Finally, in the case of the relationship in FSDAN we use statistics of the form
zF1(i) ≡ ∆F1(i)
SE(∆F1(i))
. We test a null hypothesis of ∆F1(i) = 0 ∀(i) 6= (n1) and
∆F2(j) = 0 ∀(j) 6= (n2) against an alternative of ∆F1(i) < 0 ∀(i) 6= (n1) and
∆F2(j) < 0 ∀(j) 6= (n2). We reject the null hypothesis if max{z
F1(i)} ≤ −zα and
max{zF2(j)} ≤ −zα, again, with an overall level of signiﬁcance of α.
13For the actual formula of the standard errors of this section’s statistics see Yalonetzky (2013).
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